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I AMEND THEREFORE I AM? 
DISCRETIONARY REFERENDA AND THE 
IRISH CONSTITUTION 
INTRODUCTION 
n July 1, 1937, the people of the Republic of Ireland approved a 
new constitution1 by a plebiscite.2 The public’s consent “rooted 
[the constitution] in the will of the people”3 and put it “beyond chal-
lenge,”4 except via amendment by the people.5 Specifically, Article 46 of 
the new constitution provided that, in addition to being passed in both 
houses of the Oireachtas (the Irish parliament);6 prospective amendments 
must also “be submitted by Referendum to the decision of the people”7 in 
accordance with the current referendum law.8 Since the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1937, there have been thirty9 amendment proposals sub-
mitted to the people by referendum.10 Of these, twenty-one have been 
approved.11 
Meanwhile, regular bills that do not propose amendments to the Con-
stitution may be put to referendum at the discretion of the executive 
branch. This is according to Article 27 of the Constitution of Ireland,12 
which states: 
                                                                                                             
 1. JOHN MAURICE KELLY, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE IRISH LAW AND CONSTITUTION 
8 (1961). The 1937 Constitution (Bunreacht nah Eireann) replaced the 1922 Constitution 
(Saorstat Eireann) which was a product of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty with Great Brit-
ain. JAMES CASEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN IRELAND 23–26 (1987). 
 2. CASEY, supra note 1, at 23. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 46, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/ 
Pdf%20files/Constitution%20of%20IrelandNov2004.pdf [hereinafter Ir. CONST., 1937]. 
 6. The Oireachtas is split into two houses: the Dáil Éirenn and the Seanad Éireann. 
Id. art. 15. 
 7. Id. art. 46. Any citizen who has the right to vote at an election for members of the 
Dáil Éirenn may vote in a referendum. Id. art. 47. 
 8. Id. art. 46; see Referendum Act, 2001 (Act No. 53/2001) (Ir.) available at 
http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2001/a5301.pdf. 
 9. This number does not include the 1937 plebiscite on the constitution. 
 10. See Elections Ireland, Referendums, http://electionsireland.org/results/referendum/ 
index.cfm. The First and Second Amendments did not require referendums. Article 51 of 
the Constitution allowed for a transitional period of three years in which the government 
could pass amendments without actually putting them to a referendum. After the three 
year period was over, Article 51 was deleted from the Constitution pursuant to Article 
51.4. J.M. KELLY, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 716–17 (2d ed. 1984) 
 11. Elections Ireland, Referendums, supra note 10. 
 12. See Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 27. Article 27 applies to bills that have already been 
approved by both the Seanad Éireann and the Dáil Éireann. Id. 
O
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A majority of the members of Seanad Éireann and not less than one-
third of the members of Dáil Éireann may by a joint petition addressed 
to the President by them under this Article request the President to  
decline to sign and promulgate as a law any Bill [other than a Bill  
expressed to be a Bill containing a proposal for the amendment of this 
Constitution] on the ground that the Bill contains a proposal of such  
national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be  
ascertained.13 
If the President decides that the contents of a bill are “of such national 
importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be ascertained,” 
he will decline to sign the bill until it has been approved by the people, 
either by referendum within eighteen months, or by a resolution of the 
Dáil Éirenn (The House of Representatives of the Irish parliament) with-
in eighteen months of a new election.14 To date no bill has been referred 
to the people under Article 27.15 
Having a direct say in amending their constitution is of great impor-
tance to the Irish people,16 but recent referendums reveal flaws in the 
practice.17 The integrity of a referendum does not stem from its mere in-
clusion in the constitutional structure18 but from the fact that it requires 
and, thus, reflects the people’s approval or disapproval.19 However, the 
decisions of under-informed or misinformed voters may produce mis-
leading results.20 And such ambiguities may jeopardize a referendum’s 
integrity.21 
                                                                                                             
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. In her support of the Irish referendum system, Maria Cahill writes: 
The very holding of a referendum on a proposal to amend the constitution is 
testament to the fact that what is at stake in the proposal is not something about 
which we can be casual; not something that costs us nothing; not something 
about which we can delegate our decision-making role, but rather something 
that goes to the heart of who we are, something that changes fundamentally 
those things that we take most seriously, something that has deep and enduring 
ramifications for our project of living-in-common. 
Maria Cahill, Ireland’s Constitutional Amendability and Europe’s Constitutional Ambi-
tion: The Lisbon Referendum in Context, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1191, 1200 (2008). 
 17. This note does not attempt to argue either side of the proposals at issue, but in-
stead intends to offer them as evidence that the constitutional amendment referendum 
system is flawed. 
 18. Contra Cahill, supra note 16, at 1201. 
 19. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 47. 
 20. John Gastil, Justin Reedy, & Chris Wells, When Good Voters Make Bad Policies: 
Assessing and Improving the Deliberative Quality of Initiative Elections, 78 U. COLO. L. 
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Referendums, especially on social issues, may have effects that go 
beyond the substance of the proposals at stake. For instance, the vote 
may be perceived as a statement of majority sentiment toward certain 
individuals or groups within the community.22 Because a referendum is 
required once a proposal to amend the constitution has been passed by 
both houses of the Oireachtas, the current system does not allow for con-
siderations regarding fairness, equality, or complexity of the issues.23 
This Note argues that recent referendums on constitutional amend-
ments regarding citizenship and European Union (“EU”) treaties suggest 
the government should be granted discretion to identify whether a pro-
posal to amend the Constitution should be put to the people. Part I ex-
amines Ireland’s 2004 citizenship referendum, which was problematic 
because the vote could have been seen as indicating racist or anti-
immigration sentiments,24 especially in light of the events leading up to it 
(the Belfast Agreement of 1998,25 the economic boom of the late twen-
tieth century, and the consequent influx of immigrants to Ireland, among 
others). Part II considers the referendums on the ratification of the most 
recent EU agreement, the Treaty of Lisbon,26 in order to criticize the 
government’s inability to provide voters with adequate information ex-
plaining the complexities of the proposals at stake,27 and to argue that EU 
                                                                                                             
REV. 1435, 1441 (2007) (“The public may show strong support for a concept, but reject 
the actual policy because they cannot connect the two.”). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Michaele L. Ferguson, Initiatives, Referenda, and the Problem of Democratic 
Inclusion: A Reply to John Gastil and Kevin O’Leary, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1537, 1539 
(2007). 
 23. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 46. One would assume that considerations of fairness, equal-
ity, and the probability of passing a referendum are considered by the Dáil Éirenn and the 
Seanad Éireann when debating the substance of the amendment, but the legislature is 
under no constitutional obligation to consider the fairness of the actual referendum. See 
Part II, infra. 
 24. See infra Part I. 
 25. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, U.K.–Ir., Apr. 10, 1998, 37 
I.L.M. 751 [hereinafter Belfast Agreement]. 
 26. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon 
Treaty]. 
 27. It is important to note that this discussion is not insinuating that the people of 
Ireland are incapable of understanding complex legislation and treaties. As John Gastil 
points out while discussing voters’ confusion during referendums and initiatives in the 
United States: 
[V]oters have had good reason to be confused or mistaken about a pending bal-
lot measure. . . . [L]legislative language is often archaic and complicated, filled 
with legal or bureaucratic jargon, and difficult for the average citizen to under-
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treaty ratification referendums ultimately place excessive burdens on 
both the government and the voters. Finally, Part III explains the particu-
lars of this Note’s overall proposal that the government should only be 
required to order a referendum when the matter at stake is of the utmost 
importance, and, even then, the government must carefully consider its 
ability to educate the voters on the issues. By ensuring an informed elec-
torate, such a system would protect the right of the people to participate 
in their government without sacrificing the integrity of the referendum as 
a tool of democracy. 
I. THE 2004 REFERENDUM ON CITIZENSHIP 
In 1998, the Irish and British governments and a group of political par-
ties from Northern Ireland28 met in Belfast to negotiate an agreement on 
control of the six counties in Northern Ireland.29 As part of this “Belfast 
Agreement,”30 Ireland amended its Constitution to afford Irish citizen-
ship to all persons born on the island of Ireland, including those born in 
Northern Ireland.31 Such an automatic entitlement to citizenship based on 
                                                                                                             
stand. . . . Another common problem . . . is the counterintuitive nature of the 
ballot questions, which often seek to repeal or overturn existing laws or regula-
tions, setting up a situation in which a “Yes” vote is a vote against a policy, and 
a vice-versa for a “No” vote. 
Gastil, Reedy, & Wells, supra note 20, at 1441–42. Such was the case in Ireland’s 2004 
Citizenship Referendum. A “yes” vote was a vote against the existing policy of birthplace 
citizenship and a “no” vote affirmed the current policy. However, given the highly publi-
cized debate over the referendum, this problem may not have been an issue in this in-
stance. 
 28. The political parties included the Alliance Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, 
Sien Fein, the Social Democratic Labour Party, the Ulster Unionist Party, and the Wom-
en’s Coalition. Belfast Agreement, supra note 25.  
 29. Belfast Agreement, supra note 24. 
 30. The Belfast Agreement is also known as the “Good Friday Agreement.” David 
Williams, Ireland 1880–2005: A Constitutional Perspective, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 
365 (2007). 
 31. Belfast Agreement, supra note 25; see Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 2: 
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, 
which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also 
the entitlement of all persons otherwise qualified in accordance with law to be 
citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special affinity 
with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and 
heritage. 
Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 2 
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birthplace is referred to as jus soli (or, “law of ground”).32 Since the right 
to jus soli had become part of Ireland’s Constitution after the Belfast 
Agreement,33 an amendment—and, thus, an Article 46 referendum—
were required before jus soli could be modified.34 Six years after the Bel-
fast Agreement, however, the people of Ireland pass another referen-
dum35 allowing the government to amend the constitution: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born 
in the island of Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, who does 
not have at the time of the birth of that person, at least one parent who 
is an Irish citizen or entitled to be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish 
citizenship unless provided for by law.36 
Furthermore, The Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act of 2004 states 
that: 
A person born in the island of Ireland shall not be entitled to be an Irish 
citizen unless a parent of that person has, during the period of 4 years 
immediately preceding the person’s birth, been resident in the island of 
Ireland for a period of not less than 3 years or periods the aggregate of 
which is not less than 3 years.37 
By adding the parental requirements to the citizenship laws, Ireland 
significantly curtailed its birthplace citizenship policy. 
Proponents of the citizenship referendum, including the government,38 
pointed to the influx of immigrants to Ireland,39 abuses of the Irish Con-
stitution,40 and pressure from other EU members41 as grounds for the 
                                                                                                             
 32. Bernard Ryan, The Celtic Cubs: The Controversy over Birthright Citizenship in 
Ireland, 6 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 173, 173 (2004). 
 33. See Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 2; Ryan, supra note 32, at 177–78. 
 34. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 46. 
 35. Elections Ireland, Referendums, supra note 10. 
 36. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 9. 
 37. Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act, 2004 (Act No. 38/2004) (Ir.) §4 available 
at http://www.oireachtas.ie/documents/bills28/acts/2004/a3804.pdf. 
 38. “Government” means the controlling parties in the Oireachtas, Fianna Fíal, and 
the Progressive Democratic Party, at the time. Úna Crowley, Mary Gilmartin & Rob Kit-
chin, “Vote Yes for Common Sense Citizenship”: Immigration and the Paradoxes at the 
Heart of Ireland’s ‘Céad Míle Fáilte’ 3 (Nat’l Inst. for Regional and Spatial Analysis, 
Working Paper Series No. 30, 2006), available at http://www.nuim.ie/nirsa/research/ 
documents/WPS30.pdf. 
 39. Jason DeParle, Born Irish, but with Illegal Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2008, at 
A.1. 
 40. John A. Harrington, Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-nationalist Ireland, 32 
J.L. & SOC’Y 424, 438–39 (2005). 
 41. Karolina Rostek & Gareth Davies, The Impact of Union Citizenship on National 
Citizenship Policies, 22 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 89, 129–30 (2007). 
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amendment. Opponents claimed that it gave force to racial prejudices.42 
Furthermore, it was argued that “the existing terms of the Constitution 
helped define Ireland as a compassionate and welcoming country.”43 The 
following section will argue that the citizenship referendum, in light of 
the events that led to it, created a unique constitutional problem; the 
people were put in the position in which they were asked to vote not only 
on the constitutional amendment, but also, implicitly, on race, immigra-
tion, and equality.44 
A. Events Leading to Citizenship Referendum 
1. The Belfast Agreement of 1998 
The Belfast Agreement was meant to provide a “new beginning” for 
the relationships among Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and 
Great Britain, which had been strained during years of violent dispute 
over control of the six counties in Northern Ireland.45 One way the Bel-
fast Agreement attempted to achieve this goal was to address constitu-
tional ambiguities.46 The Belfast Agreement included a provision that 
Ireland rewrite Article 2 of its constitution. The revised Article 2 reads, 
in part: 
It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of 
Ireland, which includes its islands and seas, to be part of the Irish Na-
tion. That is also the entitlement of all the persons otherwise qualified 
in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland.47 
This new language clarified that those born in Northern Ireland, which 
remained united with Great Britain, were entitled to citizenship in the 
Republic of Ireland because they were born on the “island of Ireland.”48 
The amended Article 2 also enshrined in the Constitution the concept of 
                                                                                                             
 42. Brian Lavery, Voters Reject Automatic Citizenship for Babies Born in Ireland, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2004, at 1.7. 
 43. Ryan, supra note 32, at 192 (“The principle of unconditional jus soli has been 
central to Irish nationality law for most of the period since the Irish state came into be-
ing.”); Lavery, supra note 42. 
 44. See infra Part I.B. 
 45. Belfast Agreement, supra note 25, Declaration of Support. 
 46. David Trimble, The Belfast Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1145, 1152 
(1999). 
 47. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 2; Belfast Agreement, supra note 25. 
 48. See Belfast Agreement, supra note 25. 
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birthright citizenship,49 which had been part of Irish law, but not part of 
the Constitution since the 1950s.50 
Despite the Agreement’s intent, the “entitlement” language of Article 2 
may have curtailed Ireland’s birthplace citizenship laws by using the 
term “entitlement,” rather than “automatic.”51 This significance, howev-
er, was most likely not understood at the time of the Agreement. It 
seemed to be a prudent measure by the Irish government to help further 
the peace process in Northern Ireland and bolster the possibility of unit-
ing Ireland.52 Inserting this law into the Constitution meant that it could 
only be changed by re-amending the Constitution with a referendum.53 
Due to changes in the Irish economy that were beginning to take place,54 
however, the country’s focus on the application of jus soli changed, from 
those born in Northern Ireland, to children being born to the large num-
bers of immigrants entering Ireland. 
2. Inequality and the Celtic Tiger 
Inequality is a problem that has existed in Ireland since the adoption of 
the 1937 Constitution;55 however, as John A. Harrington describes in 
Citizenship and the Biopolitics of Post-Nationalist Ireland, the inequality 
                                                                                                             
 49. Sara Catherine Barnhart, Note, Second Class Delivery: The Elimination of Birth-
right Citizenship as a Repeal of “The Pursuit of Happiness”, 42 GA. L. REV. 525, 544–45 
(2008). 
 50. See Irish Nationality and Citizenship 1956 (No. 26/1956) (Ir.) available at http:// 
www.inis.gov.ie/en/INIS/consolidationINCA.pdf/Files/consolidationINCA.pdf. 
 51. Bernard Ryan observes: 
[The principle of unconditional jus soli] attained the rare status of having been 
constitutionally entrenched as a consequence of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 
. . . . The move away from that approach to Irishness had already been seen in 
the Belfast Agreement: the ‘birthright’ clauses treated Irish citizenship as an 
entitlement rather than as automatic, while the new Article 2 deliberately subs-
tituted a personal entitlement for the previous territorial claim. 
Ryan, supra note 32, at 192–93. 
 52. According to the Belfast Agreement, both the Republic of Ireland and Great Brit-
ain recognize the status of Northern Ireland as chosen by the majority of its people. Bel-
fast Agreement, supra note 25. At the time of the Agreement and still today, that majority 
wishes to remain united with Great Britain. Should that majority change its stance and 
allow Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland, then, under the Agree-
ment, complications would be avoided as all those born in Northern Ireland would al-
ready be entitled to Irish citizenship. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 3; Trimble, supra note 46, at 
1152–53. 
 53. Ir. CONST., 1937, art 46. 
 54. See infra Part II.B. 
 55. Harrington, supra note 40, at 435. 
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of post-constitutional Ireland “was often obscured by the language of 
nationalism and . . . Roman Catholic ideas of charity.”56 Despite any so-
cial inequalities that existed, the Irish did not have a defined hierarchy 
similar to that of the English.57 In fact, legal equality for citizens is expli-
citly provided for by the Irish constitution.58 Birthright citizenship was an 
example of this legal equality because every child born in Ireland was 
equal to any other child born in Ireland in that they were all entitled to be 
Irish citizens.59 
As the Irish economy began to improve toward the end of the twentieth 
century, inequality of wealth became more noticeable.60 After two dec-
ades of stagnant economic growth and development,61 Ireland expe-
rienced an economic boom in the late twentieth century.62 Harrington 
describes the situation as follows: 
Ireland’s largely well-educated, relatively low-wage workforce, along 
with the lowest rate of corporation tax in Europe, attracted US firms 
seeking a manufacturing platform inside the European Union. Informa-
tion technology, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals led the boom, known 
to posterity as the ‘Celtic Tiger’. Gross Domestic Product . . . increased 
by 9 per cent per annum in the second half of the 1990s. Irish Gross 
National Product . . . had reached 100 per cent of the EU average in 
2000, where it had been 60 per cent at the time of joining in 1973.63 
The results of the economic boom, however, did not benefit all of Irel-
and.64 Harrington points out that “[t]he fruits of the Tiger period have 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 40 (“All citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal 
before the law.”). 
 59. Crowley, supra note 38, at 19. 
 60. Harrington, supra note 40, at 435. 
 61. Id. at 433 (labeling the 80s in Ireland as “yet another ‘lost decade’ characterized 
by jobless growth and a dramatic return to emigration”). 
 62. See id. at 434. See generally Róisín Ní Mháille Battel, Ireland’s “Celtic Tiger” 
Economy, 28 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 93, 94 (2003). 
 63. Harrington, supra note 40, at 434.; see also Battel, supra note 62, at 94 (compar-
ing Ireland’s Gross Domestic Product growth for 1999 (10.4 percent) with that of the 
United Kingdom (2.1 percent) and the United States (3.6 percent)); Alan Cowell, Ireland, 
Once a Celtic Tiger, Slackens Its Stride; Technology Collapse Drains a Town’s Valued 
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/19/business/ 
ireland-once-celtic-tiger-slackens-its-stride-technology-collapse-drains-town-
s.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1. 
 64. Battel, supra note 62, at 104 (“There are major reservations about the social con-
sequences of such sudden wealth, with deepening social divisions between those who are 
benefiting from the Celtic tiger and those still excluded from prosperity.”); Crowley, 
supra note 38, at 11–13; Harrington, supra note 40, at 434;. 
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been largely distributed in the form of tax cuts rather than social spend-
ing with predictably negative consequences for equity.”65 It was believed 
that inequality created by this imbalanced disbursement of the benefits of 
the Celtic Tiger helped drive the growing free-market economy through 
individualism and competition.66 Inequality seemed to be a necessary 
evil in order to feed the Celtic Tiger. 
3. Citizenship Tourism, Anchor Babies and the Common Sense Campaign 
The increase in inequality took an even more drastic turn when Ireland 
began to experience large amounts of immigration as a result of its eco-
nomic success.67 “In the boom years, some 40,000 foreigners from out-
side the European Union secured work permits each year to fill a short-
age of labor.”68 However, the increase in immigrants brought problems 
for Ireland too. For instance, there was backlash from citizens, and the 
immigrants were subjected to discrimination and violence.69 Meanwhile, 
though the immigration population participated in sustaining the Celtic 
Tiger economy by supplementing the workforce, many of the resulting 
economic benefits were denied to immigrants.70 Moreover, because im-
migration was a fairly new phenomenon for modern Ireland, it presented 
constitutional problems lawmakers and the Constitution’s drafters had 
not foreseen.71 
Many Irish citizens focused their growing anti-immigration sentiments 
around the notion that immigrants were taking advantage of Ireland’s 
birthright citizenship laws via so-called “citizenship tourism.”72 To en-
gage in “citizenship tourism” is to purposely travel to a country that 
                                                                                                             
 65. Harrington, supra note 40, at 435. 
 66. Id. 
 67. DeParle, supra note 39 (“Years of Irish prosperity have drawn Polish plumbers, 
Lithuanian nannies, Latvian farm workers, Filipino nurses, Chinese traders, and sub-
Saharan asylum seeker.”). 
 68. Cowell, supra note 63; see also DeParle, supra note 39. Immigrants share 11% of 
the population, which is almost as high as the United States. But see Harrington, supra 
note 40, at 437 (noting that some believe Ireland’s immigration volume was exagge-
rated). When a country allows immigration it appears “passive and vulnerable. Thus, the 
entry of relatively small numbers of asylum seekers is accounted a ‘flood’ or an ‘in-
flux[]’” so that the immigration “problem” is not a product of the county’s ability to han-
dle the immigrants, but is instead due to the vast number of immigrants. Id. 
 69. Harrington, supra note 40, at 437. 
 70. Crowley, supra note 38, at 13. (“Indeed, the system is set up so that migrant 
workers can give to the state, and contribute to its social and economic life, but are en-
titled to nothing beyond a wage.”). 
 71. Id. at 9 (“For the two centuries prior to the present period of immigration, Ireland 
has been a net exporter of people.”). 
 72. Harrington, supra note 40, at 438. 
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grants jus soli citizenship solely to give birth to a child so that the child 
will be entitled to citizenship in that country.73 The tourists (parents) then 
rely on the child’s citizenship to gain residency in the country for them-
selves.74 Ireland was a particularly desirable destination for citizenship 
tourism not only because of its grant of jus soli citizenship but also be-
cause of the special protection the Constitution of Ireland provides for 
families.75 The Irish-born children of these foreign-born parents were 
referred to as “anchor babies” because they could secure the parents’ re-
sidency in Ireland.76 As a result of citizenship tourism and anchor babies, 
Ireland’s government reported that hospitals were becoming over-
whelmed by non-Irish women showing up during late-term pregnancy.77 
Eventually, the news media began to report on the issue.78 In 2003, 
around twenty percent of babies born in Ireland were born to non-Irish 
mothers, with seventy percent of those mothers coming from sub-
Saharan Africa.79 Those opposed to the referendum, however, argued 
that the government’s numbers were misleading because they did not 
differentiate between non-Irish women who were legal residents of Irel-
and and those seeking asylum.80 
The government argued that it was “common sense” for the people of 
Ireland to want to close the loophole in the Constitution that allows for 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 41 (“The State . . . guarantees to protect the Family in its 
constitution and authority, as necessary basis of social order and as indispensible to the 
welfare of the Nation and the State.”); see also Harrington, supra note 40, at 438 (noting 
that the Constitution of Ireland gives a special protection to families). 
 76. Barnhart, supra note 49, at 543. 
 77. Ryan, supra note 32, at 188. The difficulties that the hospitals faced included 
language barriers and lack of information regarding the medical histories of the expecting 
mothers. Id. 
 78. Harrington, supra note 40, at 444; Irish Baby Laws Attract Africans, BBC NEWS, 
Oct. 16, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3199024.stm. 
 79. Irish Baby Laws Attract Africans, supra note 78. 
 80. Mark Brennock, ‘Citizenship Tourists’ a Tiny Group, Statistics Indicate, IR. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2004, available at http://www.uniset.ca/naty/maternity/it_tinygroup.htm. 
Harrington provides these statistics: 
The precise numbers of non-EU nationals arriving unannounced or late in 
pregnancy at Dublin in 2003 was put at 548 or just 2.4 per cent of the total. But, 
as critics pointed out, both percentages included non-EU nationals lawfully res-
ident in Ireland and non-nationals with an asylum application still pending, as 
well as alleged “citizenship tourists.” 
Harrington, supra note 40, at 446. 
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citizenship tourism and anchor babies,81 and the government also argued 
that the Constitution must be amended in order to protect the “integrity” 
of Irish citizenship.82 Meanwhile, Professor of Geography, Úna Crowley 
outlines a number of reasons why “there is nothing commonsensical 
about the complex issues on which the electorate were being asked to 
vote.”83 Perhaps one weakness of the government’s “common sense” 
argument was that it grouped all immigrants in the “citizenship tourist” 
category regardless of their intentions of coming to Ireland. According to 
Crowley:  
[A] commonsense understanding of immigration worked to undermine 
the legitimacy of a range of immigrants—guest workers, asylum seek-
ers[,] and refugees—by questioning their authenticity and by generaliz-
ing their motivations and experiences. The discursive construction and 
denigration of refugees, asylum seekers[,] and economic migrants’ as 
bogus, spongers, or economic parasites cast doubt on their right to stay 
in Ireland and claim citizenship for themselves and their children.84 
By generalizing, the government’s campaign spurned those immigrants 
who were legal residents.85 Opponents of the referendum considered this 
generalization racist86 and insulting to the immigrants who were legiti-
mately in Ireland.87 
The common sense campaign exemplified the contours of the unique 
constitutional issue facing both the government and the voters. The gov-
ernment wanted to close the Constitution’s citizenship loophole but 
without being perceived as anti-immigration and racist.88 By framing the 
argument as a matter of the voters’ common sense, the government at-
tempted to separate the discussion from considerations of alienage and 
race.89 Presumably, the government reasoned that, if voters believed they 
were using their common sense, their fears of being labeled “racist” 
would be less likely to dissuade them from supporting the referendum.90 
                                                                                                             
 81. Crowley, supra note 38, at 6. 
 82. Ryan, supra note 32, at 189. This argument also took the focus away from the 
number of citizenship tourists, which was being disputed, see Brennock, supra note 80; 
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Ryan, supra note 32, at 189. 
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 86. Id. at 15–17. 
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The voters were put in an even more precarious position because the de-
cision was ultimately in their hands; they could either fix the Constitu-
tion’s loophole and risk being perceived as xenophobic and racist, or 
they could continue to allow the Constitution to be used in a way it was 
not intended. 
4. Pressure from the European Union and the Chen Case 
At the time of the citizenship referendum, Ireland was the only EU 
member state to allow jus soli citizenship,91 and this discrepancy with the 
rest of the EU members was an embarrassment to the Irish government 
because it created a possible loophole for EU residency for non-EU citi-
zens.92 If a child was born in Ireland and granted Irish citizenship, and 
then the child’s parents used the child’s citizenship to gain residency in 
Ireland, they might be eligible under EU law to gain residency in any EU 
country.93 
The government’s fear that Ireland’s unique citizenship laws would 
lead to such a situation were played out in Chen v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department.94 In 2000, Man Chen, a Chinese national, traveled 
to Northern Ireland to give birth to her second child, Catherine.95 Since 
Catherine was born on the island of Ireland she was considered an Irish 
citizen under the law at the time.96 Catherine, however, was not granted 
citizenship of the United Kingdom despite the fact that Northern Ireland 
is a part of the United Kingdom, because the United Kingdom does not 
grant automatic jus soli.97 Additionally, Catherine had lost her right to 
obtain Chinese citizenship because she was born in Northern Ireland, and 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. at 446. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Rostek & Davies, supra note 41, at 130 (“[Ireland’s pre-referendum citizenship 
policies] limited the effects of . . . efforts [of EU countries with strict immigration poli-
cies] “because third-country citizens can gain access to their countries, exercising the 
right to free movement inherent in EU citizenship . . . . In this context, easiness to obtain 
Irish citizenship caused apprehension among other EU states.”). 
 94. Case C-200/02, Chen v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 2004 E.C.R. I-9925 ; 
Rostek & Davies, supra note 41, at 130. 
 95. David H. King, Note & Comment, Chen v. Secretary of State: Expanding the 
Residency Rights of Non-Nationals in the European Community, 29 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 291, 293–94 (2007). 
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supra Part I.A. 
 97. Chen, 2004 E.C.R. at para. 10. 
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she could not enter China without a visa and, then, with a visa, only for 
thirty days.98 
Ms. Chen had travelled to Belfast to give birth on the advice of her at-
torneys in order to avoid China’s policies dissuading families from hav-
ing a second child.99 Ms. Chen and her daughter then moved to Wales 
and applied for long-term residency, which the Secretary of State for the 
Home Department denied.100 The Department reasoned that Catherine, as 
an infant, could not consciously exercise any of the rights granted by the 
EU governing treaties, including the right of freedom of movement with-
in the EU.101 With limited options, Ms. Chen appealed the decision of the 
Department to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”).102 
Although the ECJ would not decide the case until after the citizenship 
referendum in Ireland,103 the ECJ Advocate General gave a preliminary 
opinion one month prior to the referendum that upheld Catherine’s “right 
to residence in the United Kingdom as long as she was not a financial 
burden on that state. Since [Catherine] would be provided for by her 
mother, she met the condition. Furthermore, [Ms.] Chen benefited from a 
right of residence derived from her daughter’s primary right.”104 Suppor-
ters of the referendum seized upon this outcome and “predicted that the 
ECJ would follow the ruling of the Advocate General,”105 which it did in 
October of 2004.106  
Because a loophole in the Irish citizenship law was the catalyst for the 
Chen case,107 the referendum’s supporters used the case to fortify their 
argument that Ireland has a responsibility to the other EU members to 
update its Constitution.108 However, the crux of the Chen decision was 
not the determination regarding Catherine’s citizenship but the ECJ’s 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. para. 13. 
 99. Id. para. 7. Although it is unclear if having the child would have been illegal, the 
Chens wanted to avoid any complications they would have faced with the birth control 
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Kingdom. Id. para 12. 
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 105. Id. at 447. 
 106. Id. 
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liberal expansion of the right of freedom of movement in the EU and the 
“grant[ing of] a ‘derivative’ right of residency to Ms. Chen.”109 It is un-
clear whether the Irish were influenced by pressures from EU members 
prior to voting in the referendum, especially considering that Irish voters 
have been willing to defy EU member interests in referendums on EU 
treaties.110 However, the concerns of Ireland’s fellow EU members were 
a likely motivation for the government’s zeal in pushing the “[vote] yes” 
and “commonsense citizenship” campaigns even harder.111 Because Irel-
and was the only member state to grant automatic birthright citizenship, 
the rest of the EU was watching the Chen case and the referendum.112 
B. The Referendum and its Effects 
An unusually large number of voters turned out for the 2004 referen-
dum—almost sixty percent of those eligible.113 The large turnout was 
presumptively a result of the public debate leading up to the referen-
dum,114 the government’s “commonsense citizenship” campaign,115 and 
the fact that the referendum was held on the same day as local and Euro-
pean parliamentary elections.116 Ultimately, the referendum passed with 
nearly eighty percent voting in favor.117  
Still, despite the wide margin of support, the issue of birthright citizen-
ship arguably may not have been ripe for a referendum.118 Even before 
the proposed change in the law, family members could not rely on a 
child’s Irish citizenship to avoid deportation; thus, the referendum was 
                                                                                                             
 109. King, supra note 95, at 295–96. 
 110. See infra Part II. Additionally, whether or not the government’s motivation of 
alleviating the pressure from other EU members was appropriate or not is outside the 
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 111. Rostek & Davies, supra note 41, at 131. 
 112. Id. at 129 (“[A]fter introducing Union citizenship, all [Member State]’s nationali-
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 113. Elections Ireland, Summary of Referendums, http://electionsireland.org/results/ 
referendum/summary.cfm (last visited October 15, 2009). Compare the results of the 
referendums on the ratification of the Nice treaties I and II, 38.4% and 48% participation, 
respectively, with the more recent referendums on the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, 
53% and 59% participation. Id. 
 114. Supra Part I.C. 
 115. Supra Part I.C. 
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 117. Elections Ireland, Summary of Referendums, supra note 113. 
 118. See Ireland Votes to End Birth Right, BBC NEWS, June 13, 2004, http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/europe/3801839.stm; see also Ryan, supra note 32, at 187. 
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potentially unnecessary because Ireland would technically not be a very 
desirable location for citizenship tourists if they knew they could still get 
deported.119 Furthermore, if claims of citizenship tourism overburdening 
hospitals had been exaggerated,120 then perhaps a solution less drastic 
than a referendum on constitutional amendment could have been found. 
More debate and investigation into citizenship tourism and its actual ef-
fects would have made the residency requirement for non-Irish parents 
seem less arbitrary.121 According to Bernard Ryan, Senior Lecturer at the 
Kent Law School: 
It was widely argued that a fundamental reform of nationality law 
should not occur without a thorough process of consultation and debate 
on the whole subject . . . . [T]he requirement of a connection with Irel-
and was not being pursued systematically, given the possibility of ac-
quiring citizenship through descent for a minimum of two generations, 
and given the lack of any proposal that an Irish-born child should be 
able to obtain citizenship through their own residence in Ireland.122 
Had the government allowed more time for debate, then perhaps the 
people could have reached a more creative and comprehensive solu-
tion.123 But, given the pressure from the media124 and the EU,125 it seems 
understandable that the government wanted to address the issue as soon 
as possible. And, considering that the citizenship problem stemmed from 
a provision in the Constitution (as a result of the Belfast Agreement),126 
an amendment was probably a necessary solution.127 
Many Irish referendums have focused on social issues such as mar-
riage, divorce, and abortion; only on rare occasions have the voters been 
asked to limit the rights of members of the community.128 Meanwhile, 
                                                                                                             
 119. Ryan, supra note 32. at 180–85, 187. 
 120. See Harrington, supra note 40, at 446. 
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 127. Ir. CONST., 1937, art. 46. 
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most past Irish referendums have expanded the rights of community 
members. For example, the Fourth Amendment lowered the minimum 
age for voting from twenty-one to eighteen;129 the Fifth Amendment re-
moved the State’s recognition of the “special position” of the Roman 
Catholic church130 and guaranteed free exercise of all religions;131 and the 
Ninth Amendment extended the right to vote in the Dáil elections to non-
Irish citizens.132 The citizenship referendum, however, asked the Irish 
people to curtail citizenship rights of a minority group to which they had 
consented just six years prior. For example, if a baby was born the day 
the new citizenship law went into effect (January 1, 2005)133 in a Dublin 
hospital, to non-Irish parents, and both parents had not been residing in 
Ireland for three of the previous four years, the baby would not have the 
same rights as a baby born under identical circumstances on December 
31, 2004. 
Indeed, the citizenship referendum was unlike most previous referen-
dums on individual rights; it created a situation where the voters’ had the 
opportunity to send current immigrants and future would-be immigrants 
the message that they would no longer be welcomed.134 According to 
Harrington, “A third of ‘yes’ voters interviewed stated they ‘were moti-
vated by anti-immigrant feelings,’ 36 per cent felt the country was being 
exploited by immigrants and 27 per cent felt there were too many immi-
grants in the country.”135 Although most voters merely intended to fix the 
Constitution’s loophole, these statistics provide evidence that the refe-
rendum could quite plausibly be perceived as an anti-immigration state-
ment.136 When the results of a referendum can be “interpreted by some as 
a statement by the majority that a particular minority is undeserving of 
                                                                                                             
 129. See id. art. 16. 
 130. CASEY, supra note 1, at 550. 
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 135. Harrington, supra note 40, at 448. 
 136. As Una Crowley notes: 
While Michael McDowell, the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform 
who introduced the referendum, claimed it was not racist, the coordinating 
body for groups opposed to the referendum disagreed. [The] Campaign Against 
the Racist Referendum, argued that if the referendum was passed “some child-
ren born here will be less equal than others because of their parents’ origins. 
Racial discrimination will be put into the constitution.” 
Crowley, supra note 38, at 19. 
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full inclusion in the community,” there is reason for concern.137 This is 
especially true where the particular minority does not have a chance to 
vote.138 Unfortunately, the current procedure for referendums does not 
allow the government to take such factors into account when deciding 
whether to put an issue to the people.139 The responsibility—and, thus, 
the culpability for unfavorable results—are then transferred to the voters 
because they are the ultimate decision-makers. 
Referendums require voters to balance the advantages and disadvan-
tages of a given proposal. Voters must trade-off the disadvantages of 
their choice for its advantages. But when voters are asked to amend a law 
they had already approved and the disadvantages of doing so include the 
potential for severe tension, if not hostile interaction, between majority 
and minority,140 the government should be afforded more latitude than 
the Irish Constitution currently provides in deciding whether the issue 
should go to a referendum.141 
II. THE LISBON TREATY REFERENDUM 
The EU is governed by treaties that are signed and ratified by its mem-
ber states.142 In order to provide for its continued growth and integration, 
the EU has had to amend these treaties.143 When an EU treaty is 
amended, it must be signed and ratified by each member state in accor-
dance with that state’s procedures.144 In ratifying an EU treaty, the mem-
ber states transfer powers that belong to their respective national gov-
                                                                                                             
 137. Ferguson, supra note 22, at 1539. 
 138. “Every citizen who has the right to vote at an election for members of Dáel Éi-
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ion, 23 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 105, 106 (2001) (“The ratification of new treaties is vital to 
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ernments and “delegate [them] to the European Union.”145 When Ireland 
decided to join the European Communion,146 the Oireachtas delegated 
some of its constitutionally-vested rights to the EU.147 Because these 
rights were vested by the Constitution, an amendment148—and, thus, a 
referendum149—were necessary. Subsequent Irish Supreme Court cases 
have held that, under the Constitution, both the ratification of amend-
ments to EU treaties and the ratification of new treaties require referen-
dums.150 Such referendums, which propose to amend or replace EU trea-
ties, have been categorized by Patricia Roberts-Thompson as “EU treaty 
referendums.”151 In light of the recent EU treaty referendums on the Lis-
bon treaty,152 however, the law that ratification of EU treaties requires a 
referendum153 may need to be reexamined, not because of the referen-
dums’ outcome, but because the gravity of the referendum hinges on the 
importance of the decision154 and on whether people can be properly in-
formed about the issue.155 If the decision is important but the people can-
not be properly informed about the merits and limitations of the treaty, 
then the people’s acquiescence is either unnecessary or inappropriate, 
and the decision to ratify should be left to the government. 
This section will explore the efforts taken by the Irish government to 
inform the voters about the Lisbon treaty and how, despite these efforts, 
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many voters still claimed they lacked sufficient information.156 In addi-
tion, this section will suggest that the difficulties posed by EU treaties 
are just another indication that it is necessary for Ireland to rethink its 
amendment process. 
A. The Referendum Commission 
In order to better inform the voting public on the issues presented at a 
referendum, the government of Ireland established the Referendum 
Commission in the Referendum Act of 1998.157 The Referendum Com-
mission was an independent body that “initially had the role of setting 
out the arguments for and against referendum proposals . . . .” 158 Howev-
er, the Referendum Act of 2001159 amended the 1998 Act and the current 
primary functions of the Referendum Commission are: 
To prepare one or more statements containing a general explanation of 
the subject matter of the proposal and of the text thereof in the relevant 
Bill . . .[;] to publish and distribute those statements in such manner and 
by such means including the use of television, radio and other electron-
ic media as the Commission considers most likely to bring them to the 
attention of the electorate . . . [; and] to promote public awareness of 
the referendum and encourage the electorate to vote at the poll.160 
Apparently, by creating the Referendum Commission, the Irish gov-
ernment acknowledged its duty to inform the voters about the proposals 
at referendum.161 
It is unrealistic to assume that the voting public will become experts in 
the treaties proposed for ratification,162 but it is necessary that a voting 
public at least be informed on the basic issues surrounding the treaty,163 
                                                                                                             
 156. Post-Referendum Survey in Ireland: Preliminary Results (European Commission: 
Flash Eurobarometer No. 245, 2008) at 2, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ 
flash/fl_245_en.pdf. 
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especially considering the importance and historical significance of many 
referendums.164 Despite the efforts of the Referendum Commission, the 
voters at past referendums on EU treaties were not always equipped with 
enough information to make informed decisions.165 But, governments can 
only do so much to prepare the voters.166 Roberts-Thompson explains, 
“Treaty referendums are the most problematic of all referendums for 
governments to conduct . . . their source is largely external to the national 
political system, they are held more frequently than other [EU] referen-
dums, and governments find themselves with little control over their 
conduct or timing.”167 Meanwhile, the normal difficulties the government 
inevitably faces in informing the citizens about anything,168 are further 
complicated by EU treaty referendums because of the separation between 
the voters and the EU treaties.169 Unlike referendums on the national 
government and social issues, it may be difficult for voters to understand 
how the ratification actually affects them, and this can lead to apathy170 
regardless of the government’s efforts. 
B. The Referendums on the Lisbon Treaty 
1. Background 
On December 13, 2007, the member states of the EU signed a treaty in 
Lisbon171 that was to amend the treaties governing the EU at that time.172 
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The Lisbon treaty was also intended to “replace the draft European con-
stitution, which was thrown out by voters in France and the Netherlands 
in 2005.”173 In addition, the treaty was to improve the EU’s effectiveness 
and efficiency by reorganizing the EU governing bodies in order to 
change the way the EU makes laws.174 Currently, some of the proposed 
EU laws are decided jointly by the Council of Ministers (composed of 
the ministers from each member state who are charged with overseeing 
issues of the type under consideration)175 and the European Parliament 
(composed of representatives elected by the citizens of each member 
state).176 Other decisions are made exclusively by the Council of Minis-
ters.177 The Treaty of Lisbon proposed to expand the range of issues for 
which decisions must be approved by both the Council of Ministers and 
the European Parliament.178 The treaty also proposed an allowance for 
citizen initiatives179 and sought to clarify, in specific areas of law and 
policy, whether the EU, the national governments, or both, have the au-
thority to act.180 
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2. Rejection of the Lisbon Treaty 
All twenty-seven members of the EU have signed the Lisbon treaty, 
but it cannot take force until it is ratified by each member state in accor-
dance with their national procedures.181 Ireland is the only member of the 
EU that required a referendum to ratify the treaty,182 and, on June 13, 
2008, the people voted against ratification.183 The rejection disappointed 
the Irish government, which had signed and supported the treaty, 184 and 
it frustrated the other members of the EU.185 
Statistical evidence supports the theory that, despite the efforts of the 
Referendum Commission, many voters did not feel as if they were prop-
erly informed about the treaty prior to the vote.186 According to a post-
referendum survey conducted by Eurobarometer, which regularly con-
ducts surveys on behalf of the European Commission, over half of the 
eligible voters who did not vote abstained because they “did not fully 
understand the issues raised by the referendum” and over forty percent 
felt they “were not informed about the issues at stake.”187 Among the 
reasons that voters voted “no,” the most common was, “Because I do not 
know enough about the Treaty and would not want to vote for something 
I am not familiar with[.]”188 Dr. Michael Holmes, Senior Lecturer at Li-
verpool Hope University, asserts that the number of voters claiming they 
did not know enough about the treaty “could be a reflection of the fact 
that there was a multiplicity of reasons for voting ‘No’, rather than any 
single dominant narrative.”189 For instance, special interest groups each 
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offered the public a variety of different reasons for opposing ratification 
of the treaty.190 
Holmes’s proposition suggests that voters had multiple reasons for vot-
ing against the treaty but simply failed to articulate one definitive reason. 
Although this is surely possible, an alternative conclusion can be drawn 
from Dr. Holmes’s assertion. The multiple sources of the opposition 
campaign and the different issues they opposed may have confused the 
voters as to what the issues actually were.191 This is supported by the fact 
that different members within the opposition offered reasons for rejecting 
the treaty that contradicted others’ reasons.192 For example, the Socialist 
party believed that the treaty did not properly support workers’ rights and 
was “fundamentally pro-business;”193 meanwhile businesses and business 
leaders claimed the treaty “would permit EU interference in Ireland’s 
highly pro-business tax rates.”194 Based on the conflicting information 
that was being provided to the voters, it is unsurprising that many did not 
feel comfortable voting for the treaty. 
Although it appears that the Referendum Commission failed in its duty 
to provide the voters with adequate information on the issues,195 it could 
also be argued that the nature of the Lisbon treaty actually made it too 
difficult for the Referendum Commission to fulfill its responsibility. This 
theory seems particularly compelling, considering the Lisbon treaty was 
not the first treaty the Irish people had rejected, and there were legitimate 
questions as to the adequacy of the information the voters took to the 
polls. In a 2001 referendum, the majority of voters rejected the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty of Nice,196 which would have allowed the EU to ex-
pand to twenty-seven members.197 Those in favor of the treaty felt that 
the spreading of misconceptions by the opposition as to the treaty’s pur-
pose—(the opposition claimed the purpose focused on defense rather 
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than expansion)198—and low voter turnout199 together evinced that the 
voters were either uninformed or confused about the issues.200 A year 
later, another referendum was held on the Treaty of Nice and the people 
approved ratification.201 
As with the Treaty of Nice, the number of voters and nonvoters who 
felt they were not adequately informed about the Lisbon treaty202 sug-
gests there was a disconnect between the information being provided and 
the information the voters received. Meanwhile, the Referendum Com-
mission spent €5 million during the Lisbon treaty referendum to provide 
the voters with information on the issues and encourage them to vote.203 
The Referendum Commission’s expectation is that it can provide an ex-
planation of the issues in simple and understandable language,204 but EU 
treaties and the issues surrounding them are far from simple.205 Providing 
minimal explanations or merely conveying the “gist” of the treaty may 
be insufficient because such approaches weaken the significance of the 
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referendum by failing to truly require the acquiescence of the people. If 
the voters are unfamiliar with actual issues surrounding the treaty then 
they are not voting on the treaty itself—rather, they are merely voting on 
which campaign was more effective.206 It is worth mentioning again that 
the average voter is not expected to be extensively familiar with the trea-
ty,207 but, when the issues are so complex that voters are voting on the 
basis of misconceptions or factors irrelevant to the treaty,208 then it must 
be questioned whether a vote to approve ratification can actually be tak-
en as legitimate acquiescence of the people is obtained. 
3. The Second Referendum on the Lisbon Treaty 
On October 2, 2009, Ireland held a second referendum on ratification 
of the Lisbon treaty.209 The referendum passed with over sixty-seven 
percent voting in favor.210 With another year to “digest” the treaty,211 it is 
reasonable to assume that the electorate developed a better understanding 
of the issues. However, there was still confusion as to the effect the trea-
ty would have on social issues in Ireland.212 The New York Times re-
ported that “[s]ome ‘no’ campaigners worry that [the treaty] could usher 
in legalized abortion. . . . Others have played up fears that the treaty 
could undermine Ireland’s military neutrality and drive down pay. Sup-
porters say that neither policy will change.”213 Although the treaty itself 
was not changed,214 the European Council and the Referendum Commis-
sion did attempt to clarify these issues215 and to clarify the treaty’s exact 
affect on the nomination of Commissioners to the European Commis-
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sion.216 Furthermore, based on earlier reactions to the 2009 referendum, 
it seems the most significant change between the 2008 and 2009 referen-
dums was the depletion of Ireland’s economy.217 Concerns about the 
economy and unemployment218 most likely explain the increase of five 
percent in voter turnout.219 Whether the “yes” vote was a result of assur-
ances as to what was not in the treaty or concerns over the economy, it 
remains unclear whether the voters’ understanding of how the treaty 
would actually affect Ireland had improved for the 2009 referendum. 
4. The Lisbon Treaty Difficulties 
Based on the difficulties faced by the government, the Referendum 
Commission, and the voters during the Lisbon treaty referendums, it is 
appropriate to consider whether a referendum is the most effective way 
to ratify an EU treaty.220 If a referendum is required solely to fulfill its 
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constitutional role,221 then it can be reduced to a mere procedure and can 
be seen as actually compromising its intended significance rather than as 
“something that goes to the heart of who [the Irish people] are, some-
thing that changes fundamentally those things that we take most serious-
ly. . . . ”222 Alternatively, if the government is allowed the discretion to 
decide which amendment proposals should be put to referendum, then 
the government could evaluate case-by-case whether the proposal rises to 
the level of national importance requiring the voters’ permission and is 
of such a nature that the voters will be able to make an informed decision 
on the actual issues presented. The government, therefore, would be able 
to protect the integrity of the referendum as a democratic tool. 
III. A PROPOSED REVISION TO THE AMENDMENT REFERENDUM SYSTEM 
The citizenship referendum and the recent referendums on the ratifica-
tion of the Treaty of Lisbon provide evidence that the referendum system 
in Ireland should be revised. Under the Irish Constitution, if a bill con-
tains an amendment to the Constitution then it must be submitted to the 
people at a referendum.223 For those bills that do not require amendment, 
the President, with the recommendation of the Oireachtas, decides if the 
issue is “of such national importance that the will of the people thereon 
ought to be ascertained.”224 This Note proposes that in order to ensure, 
or, at least, improve the chances that a proposal actually deserves the 
people’s approval, the referendum process for regular bills should apply 
to amendment proposals and treaty approval referendums as well. Article 
27 should continue to govern decisions as to whether a proposal is “of 
such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought to be 
ascertained.”225 The President should have discretion after receiving the 
recommendation of the Seanad Éireann and Dáil Éireann.226 
A danger to any referendum system or popular voting system in gener-
al is that misguided voters—ill-equipped with incorrect or insufficient 
information—may not be voting in line with their personal beliefs and 
values with respect to the proposal at issue and are instead voting on the 
basis of the information they have been provided.227 Again, this is not to 
say that all voters must be political experts aware of every nuance of any 
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given proposal—that would be an unrealistic burden.228 “A more modest 
goal . . . is that voters must at least be able to follow reliable cues that 
guide them to a voting choice consistent with their deeper values and 
understanding.”229 An alternative amendment system would allow the 
government to account for these concerns. 
The revised system would not undermine democracy; it would instead 
ensure that the voters’ participation in their democracy is legitimate and 
fair. In support of the current system, Dr. Maria Cahill, Lecturer of Law 
at the University College Cork, argues that drawbacks in the referendum 
system are balanced out by the constitutional system and its history, 
which provides for the referendum in the first place.230 According to Ca-
hill, the value of an amendment referendum stems from the magnitude of 
the constitutional system in which the referendum functions.231 There-
fore, the referendum should “not be judged on its own merits.”232 How-
ever, following Cahill’s logic may lead us in the opposition direction. If 
we assume that the constitutional system bears significance, then a refe-
rendum to amend the constitution is not necessarily significant solely 
because it exists. This would make it merely a procedure. Conversely, 
because a referendum to amend the constitution plays such a significant 
role in the constitutional system, the referendum must be substantially 
worthy of its role on its own merits. 
Moreover, the constitutional amendment referendum does not exist in a 
vacuum;233 it must be viewed in terms of its circumstances and effects.234 
Michaele Ferguson, Assistant Professor of Political Science, recognizes 
how “a concern for democratic inclusion demands broader attention, not 
only to the fairness of procedures relating to the crafting and debating of 
initiatives and referend[ums] prior to an election, but also—in certain 
cases—to perceptions of fairness and their consequences for democratic 
participation after an election.”235 The citizenship proposal illustrated an 
instance where issues of fairness and equality should at least have been 
considered before the referendum. Changing the amendment referendum 
system will assist the government in protecting the voters should another 
constitutional problem arise that is as unpredictable as the citizenship 
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tourism problem and just as likely—if not more likely—to compromise 
fairness and equality. 
Ironically, implementation of the amendment system suggested here 
would, in and of itself, require an amendment to the Irish Constitution;236 
thus, a referendum would be necessary.237 In the end, though, the new 
amendment system would likely result in a significant reduction in over-
all referendums as a result of its new discretionary standard. All in all, to 
assume that the Irish would not at least entertain the prospect of such a 
revision to the system would be an underestimation of the Irish people 
and the importance they place on participation in their democracy.238 By 
giving the government discretion to choose which amendment proposals 
are appropriate to offer to the people for their assent, the suggested sys-
tem would protect the integrity of the referendum process and the 
people’s participation in the most important decisions that face their 
country. 
CONCLUSION 
The most recent referendums illustrate why a more conservative ap-
proach to referendums is necessary in Ireland. The citizenship referen-
dum proved that constitutional problems and loopholes are unpredicta-
ble,239 and the effect or message that the vote sends can be almost as im-
portant as the substance of the referendum itself.240 Future constitutional 
problems may require creative and sometimes difficult decisions. Allow-
ing the government some discretion over whether to put an amendment 
proposal to the people allows the government to protect the public if such 
a procedure would be inappropriate in light of the considerations dis-
cussed above.  
In addition, if the EU wishes to continue to grow and integrate, then 
the member states can expect more treaties to be ratified.241 And, unless 
the EU develops its own system for member state treaty ratification,242 
Ireland will likely face another EU treaty referendum soon.243 The Treaty 
of Lisbon and the Treaty of Nice both provide evidence of the difficulties 
EU treaty referendums present for both the government and the voters, 
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and they perhaps prove that, in certain instances, ratification of an EU 
treaty should not be decided by referendum. 
The referendum system in Ireland has served the State well since the 
1937 Constitution was approved.244 However, the recent referendums 
have shown that the referendum system itself needs to be amended. In 
order to protect the integrity of the referendum as a tool of democracy, 
and in order to be sure that the issues that truly require the assent of the 
people are not passed without the assent of the people, the decision to 
hold a referendum should always be made at the discretion of the mem-
bers of the legislative and executive branches. 
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